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We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the pol-
icy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargain-
ing ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default,
which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies that can be
implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional
and infinite policy spaces. It is convenient to start by characterizing the set of
immovable policies that are implemented, once reached as default. These poli-
cies form a weakly stable set and, conversely, any weakly stable set is supported
by some equilibrium. Using these results, we show that minimum-winning coali-
tions may not form and that a player who does not propose may nevertheless earn
all of the surplus from agreement. We then consider how equilibrium outcomes
change as we vary the order in which players propose, the identity of proposers,
and the set of winning coalitions. First, if the policy space is well ordered, then the
committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly
stable set, but this result does not generalize to other cases. We also show, surpris-
ingly, that a player may prefer not to be given the opportunity to propose and that
the set of immovable policies may shrink as the quota increases. Finally, we derive
conditions under which immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form a
consistent choice set.
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1. Introduction
The task of a committee is to select a policy to implement from some policy space.
As Compte and Jehiel (2010) note, committees in effect search over the policy space
by endogenously drawing policies/proposals and then implement a proposal accord-
ing to a stopping rule. Congress and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
instate committees that stop deliberating as soon as some proposal wins a final vote,
while the European Union’s (EU’s) Council of Ministers reaches a decision by final vote
when the issue must be addressed urgently or some government wants to signal to
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its domestic audience (see Heisenberg 2005). Conventional bargaining models, like
Rubinstein (1982) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989), focus on such committees: the game
ends when some proposal wins against the status quo. However, an important class of
committees does not use a final vote stopping rule. In particular, the Council of Minis-
ters reaches more than 80% of its decisions without a final vote, including on issues as
controversial as trade and budgetary policy (cf. Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006 and Mattila
2009). Analogously, insiders report that the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank
(ECB) decide on the interest rate without a final vote. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
proceedings end (and a policy is implemented) in such committees when discussion
grinds to a halt.
We present and analyze a model of decision making without final voting, in which
the committee entertains a single policy at a time. The game is played by proposers and
voters: some players may both propose and vote. The game starts with an initial default.
Players have the opportunity to propose amendments to the default in a fixed sequence
(the protocol), which can depend on the ongoing default. If a winning coalition of vot-
ers accepts the proposal, then the default is amended; if you like, the committee takes a
new policy seriously. The new default may then in turn be amended. A default is imple-
mented when all of the proposers have failed to amend it, either because they have cho-
sen not to propose an alternative or because their proposals have not secured sufficient
support from voters. (This is what we mean by discussion grinding to a halt.) Payoffs in
the game only depend on the policy implemented. Two aspects of this noncooperative
game are worth highlighting. First, preferences, and the sets of winning coalitions and
of proposers determine an underlying cooperative game (independently of the protocol
and the initial default). Second, the agenda is endogenous in two senses here: chosen
proposals determine both the policies on the agenda and the order in which they are
considered.
Our main results describe the policies that can be reached in a pure-strategy station-
ary Markov equilibrium from any initial default and for any protocol. We use an algo-
rithmic technique, which exploits a relationship between equilibria of the game and a
solution concept for the underlying cooperative game:
Any equilibrium determines a function, which maps from any default to the imple-
mented policy. Stationarity implies that any policy in the range of this mapping is “im-
movable”: the equilibrium prescribes that this policy is implemented whenever it is the
initial default. We show that the immovable policies form a weakly stable set in a related
simple game (Proposition 2). We obtain the related simple game by restricting the set of
winning coalitions to those that contain a proposer, and a weakly stable set of policies
satisfies the same strict internal stability conditions as a von Neumann–Morgenstern
(henceforth vNM) stable set, but external stability is weakened to allow for weak social
preference.1 We also obtain a converse result. Specifically, for any closed weakly stable
set, we construct equilibria whose immovable policies are exactly that weakly stable set
(Proposition 1).2
1Every vNM stable set is, therefore, weakly stable.
2This result provides microfoundations of weakly stable sets as a by-product of our analysis. Propositions
1 and 2 imply that the policies that can be implemented in any equilibrium are the union of weakly stable
sets.
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Equilibrium outcomes have some surprising properties. We demonstrate by exam-
ple that a winning coalition may amend a default to a policy that is implemented, leaving
all coalition members worse off than at the initial default, all players may earn a surplus
in a majority-rule divide-the-dollar game, and a player who does not propose may earn
all of the surplus from agreement.
Our algorithmic technique reveals that equilibrium outcomes depend on the order
in which players can propose (the protocol) and on the set of winning coalitions, which
are determined both by the set of proposers and by the voters who can amend a default.
Accordingly, we exploit the characterization results (Propositions 1 and 2) to study how
variations in the protocol and the winning coalition affect the policy implemented from
any initial default.
We start by considering how a committee chair can affect the policy reached from a
given default by changing the protocol for a fixed set of proposers. Changing protocols
may affect the policy reached from a given default. However, we show, strikingly, that
the chair can only affect the policy implemented by changing the order in which players
propose at the initial default. Furthermore, varying the order in which a given set of pro-
posers move does not affect the set of winning coalitions or of weakly stable sets, so the
image of an equilibrium is unchanged. Accordingly, fix an equilibrium whose immov-
able policies are a given weakly stable set. If the policy space is well ordered (no player
is indifferent between any two policies) and there is a unique weakly stable set, then a
chair who proposes cannot improve on a protocol in which she proposes last. This result
does not generalize to games in which a player may be indifferent between policies or
there are several weakly stable sets: the chair may then be best off when another player
proposes last.
We then study the implications of varying the set of winning coalitions via changes
in the quota and in the set of proposers. According to a natural conjecture, increasing
the quota expands the set of immovable policies because coalitions that could destabi-
lize policies are no longer winning with a larger quota.3 We provide conditions for this
conjecture to be true, but we also show that increasing the quota may contract the set of
immovable policies. The basis for this surprising result is that changes in the set of win-
ning coalitions have potentially conflicting effects on the internal and external stability
conditions for a set of policies to be weakly stable. Variations in the set of proposers can
have analogously surprising results. We show by example that a player may be worse off
if she is given the opportunity to propose. The intuition again turns on the implications
of changing winning coalitions for the structure of weakly stable sets.
We end the paper by extending our analysis in three directions.
According to our model, players only receive (undiscounted) payoffs when a policy
is implemented. However, our model has essentially the same game tree as a model
without a stopping rule in which either the current default or an agreed policy is imple-
mented each round and becomes the new default, and players earn the net present value
of the stream of utilities that accrue from the implemented policies. One might, there-
fore, conjecture that equilibria in our model are the limit of equilibria in the alternative
3Arguments of this sort have been repeatedly used during the prolonged debates over qualified majority
voting in the Council of Ministers.
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model with repeated implementation as players become more patient. This conjecture
is true if the policy space is finite and well ordered. Indeed, equilibrium strategy com-
binations in our model are then also equilibria of the related model when players are
patient enough.
Any weakly stable set is contained in a consistent choice set. We provide weaker con-
ditions on the stationarity of strategies under which any semi-Markovian equilibrium’s
immovable policies are a consistent choice set, and we show that every consistent choice
set is supported by some semi-Markovian equilibrium.
Finally, we extend our results to an open rule bargaining game in the spirit of Baron
and Ferejohn (1989), where a policy is implemented if and only if a proposer successfully
moves the previous question. We show that any weakly stable set can be supported in an
open rule bargaining game and that the policy set supported by any equilibrium must
satisfy internal stability. However, there may be equilibria that support policy sets that
fail external stability.
We characterize equilibria in Section 3. In Section 4, we explore how the policy im-
plemented varies with the protocol and with the set of winning coalitions. In Section 5,
we provide microfoundations for the consistent choice set, study equilibria in games
with repeated implementation, and analyze our open rule bargaining model. Section 6
reviews the related literature. We conclude in Section 7. We relegate longer proofs to
an Appendix. Additional arguments are available in a supplementary file on the journal
website, http://econtheory.org/supp/1318/supplememt.pdf.
2. The model
We consider a finite committee that consists of m ≥ 1 proposers, M ≡ {1    m}, and
n ≥ 2 voters, N ≡ {1     n}. The set of committee members, or players, is thus C ≡
M ∪N . A player may be both a proposer and a voter, but we also allow for the possibility
that M ∩N =∅. Our model therefore encompasses the Council of Ministers, where the
European Commission makes all proposals but cannot vote, and most Annual General
Meetings (AGMs), where management proposes corporate policies to shareholders, who
then vote (cf. Matsusaka and Ozbas 2012).
Let X be a compact metric space of policies, which may be finite or a subspace of
a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. The preferences of each player i ∈ C on X are
represented by a weak order i. Let i and ∼i denote the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of i, respectively. We will say that the policy space is well ordered if every player
has a linear order over X . We assume that preferences are continuous.
Assumption A0 (Continuous preferences). For all i ∈ C and all x ∈ X , the upper and
lower contour sets of x associated with i are closed.
The committee has to reach a collective choice from X , with initial default policy
x0 ∈X . The default can only be amended by a winning coalition of voters. We write W⊆
2N \ {∅} for the set of winning coalitions of voters. We make the following assumption
throughout.
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Assumption A1. The set of winning coalitionsW is both
(i) monotonic: S ∈W andN ⊇ S′ ⊇ S implies S′ ∈W
(ii) proper: S ∈W implies (N \ S) /∈W.
In words, (i) every superset of a winning coalition is winning, and (ii) a coalition and
its complement cannot both be winning.
Decision making takes place as follows. Each of a (possibly) infinite number of dis-
crete rounds, indexed by t = 12    , starts in the shadow of an ongoing default pol-
icy xt−1. For each possible default x ∈ X , there is a fixed protocol πx : {1    mx} → M ,
mx ∈ N, that determines the order in which the proposers (i.e., the players in M) are
given the opportunity to propose policies to amend the ongoing default. That is, when
x ∈ X is the current default, protocol πx gives proposer πx(k) the kth opportunity to
amend x for each k ∈ {1    mx}. Each proposer i ∈ M has at least one opportunity to
amend the default in every round: |π−1x (i)| ≥ 1 for all i ∈ M and all x ∈ X . We denote
the collection of protocols by π ≡ {πx}x∈X . Proposers do not have to offer a policy when
given the opportunity to do so; instead they can “pass.” When a proposer passes, we
assume, for expositional convenience, that she offers the current default x.
Consider a history that ends in round t with default xt−1 after k− 1 proposals have
been made in that round. The kth proposer (i.e., player πxt−1(k) ∈ M) then makes an
offer of y ∈ X . If y = xt−1 (the proposal is to amend the default). then y is put to a
vote by all players in N , who vote sequentially (in an arbitrary order).4 If those who
vote in favor constitute a winning coalition, then the default is amended to y and a new
round starts. In all other cases, the consequences depend on whether there are any more
opportunities to propose in that round. If k < mxt−1 and either y = xt−1 or y loses the
vote, then the round continues with proposer πxt−1(k+ 1) given the k+ 1th opportunity
to amend xt−1. By contrast, the game ends (with implementation of default xt−1) after
the last proposer in a round either passes (y = xt−1) or proposes an amendment that
secures less than a winning majority of votes. In sum, bargaining ends if and only if all
proposers either pass or fail in their attempt to amend the default.
It is convenient to spell this out formally.
Step 1. If the kth proposer, πxt−1(k), is given the opportunity to make a proposal, she
proposes ytk ∈X .
Step 2. (a) If ytk = xt−1, then ytk is put to an immediate vote against xt−1. Members
of N sequentially vote yes or no. If the set of players who voted yes is
an element of W, then ytk is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected and x
t−1
remains the default.
(b) If ytk = xt−1 (i.e., the proposer passes), then there is no voting and xt−1
remains the default.
4It is readily checked that subgame perfection makes the voting order irrelevant. Furthermore, we show
in Section C of the supplementary file that the set of equilibrium outcomes would be unchanged if we
modified the game to allow for abstention.
450 Anesi and Seidmann Theoretical Economics 9 (2014)
Step 3. (a) If ytk = xt−1 is accepted, then it displaces xt−1 as the default policy and the
round ends.
(b) If ytk = xt−1 is rejected or if there is no voting because ytk = xt−1, then (i) the
game moves to Step 1 with k increased by 1 if k < mxt−1 or (ii) x
t−1 is im-
plemented and the game ends if k=mxt−1 .
We assume that all players possess perfect recall and that the game is of perfect in-
formation: At any stage, each player observes and recalls everything that has previously
transpired in the game.
Players only care about the policy that is eventually implemented, rather than the
route from the initial default to the implemented policy. When comparing two differ-
ent paths, each player i ∈ C therefore prefers the one that yields the best final policy
outcome with respect to i. Bargaining indefinitely makes all players worse off than if
any policy is implemented after a finite number of rounds.5 This assumption is con-
sistent with the conventional claim that the Council is worst off when it fails to decide
(e.g., Thomson 2011). Our assumption that players do not discount is consistent with
evidence that the Council of Ministers typically reaches urgent decisions by a final vote
procedure (cf. Heisenberg 2005). Let (πx0) be the bargaining game defined by this
process.
Following the lead of the previous literature, our main focus will be on subgame per-
fect equilibria of (πx0) in which players use pure stationary Markov strategies. A strat-
egy consists of two components: one specifying a player’s choice when given the op-
portunity to propose; the other specifying a voter’s choice after a proposal is made. In
proposal stages, strategies only depend on the default and the identity of the remaining
proposers in the current round; in voting stages, strategies only depend on the current
default, the proposal just made, votes already cast, and the remaining proposers in the
current round. To avoid repeatedly having to include the relevant qualification, we will
refer to stationary Markov pure-strategy equilibria of our game as equilibria throughout
the paper—with the sole exception of Section 5.2, where we study history-dependent
strategies.
Our restriction to pure strategies precludes existence in some well known cases, such
as the Condorcet paradox; in other cases, there may be multiple equilibria.
Any stationary Markov strategy combination σ = (σi)i∈C generates an outcome
function fσ , which assigns to every x ∈ X and every k ∈ {1    mx} the unique final
outcome fσ(xk) eventually implemented (given σ) when x is the ongoing default and
the kth proposer is about to move (in any round t). We are particularly interested in
fσ(x01), which describes the final policy outcome of the game from any initial default
x0 ∈ X when players act according to σ . As we will often refer to it in what follows, we
5This assumption precludes indefinite bargaining and ensures that the one-shot deviation principle ap-
plies even though the game is not continuous at infinity. The principle would hold in games with a finite
policy space if payoffs were discounted by the number of rounds, and players were patient enough. Our
main results would still be true in such games if, in addition, we assumed that the policy space is well
ordered.
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will sometimes abuse notation and write fσ(x0) instead of fσ(x01). The characteriza-
tion of this function for all possible equilibria of (πx0) is the subject matter of the next
section.
3. Equilibrium characterization
3.1 Preliminaries
There are two principal sorts of questions we want to address: the first concerns the
determination of equilibrium behavior and policy outcomes from any initial default; the
second concerns how institutional details affect the set of policy outcomes. We address
the former in this section and postpone the latter to Section 4.
First of all, we need to modify the collection of winning coalitions, W, so as to ob-
tain a collection of coalitions that better accounts for the distribution of power among
committee members. LetW ≡ {S ⊆ C : (S ∩N) ∈W & (S ∩M) =∅}. That is, a coalition S
belongs toW if the voters in S constitute a winning coalition and S includes at least one
proposer. Note thatW inherits monotonicity and properness from W.
We define two social preference relations, which we call P-dominance and R-
dominance, respectively, as follows: for all x y ∈X ,
x P y ⇐⇒ ∃S ∈W :xi y ∀i ∈ S
x R y ⇐⇒ ∃S ∈W :xi y ∀i ∈ S
A subset of policies V ⊆X is said to be P-internally stable if and only if it satisfies
(ISP ) ∀x y ∈ V : ¬(x P y).
Furthermore, V is said to be R-externally stable if and only if it satisfies
(ESR) ∀x ∈X \ V , ∃y ∈ V : y R x.
We say that V is a weakly stable set if and only if it is both P-internally stable and R-
externally stable. The collection of weakly stable sets is denoted by V .
Weakly stable sets will play a central role in the analysis to follow. Before we proceed
any further, it is worth discussing some of their properties. First of all, a vNM stable set
is a weakly stable set that is P-externally stable: that is, it satisfies a variant of (ESR) in
which R is replaced by P . Conversely, if the policy space X is well ordered (i.e., if all the
i’s are linear orders), then V corresponds to the collection of vNM stable sets. This is
not true when X is not well ordered: there may be policy sets that are weakly stable but
not vNM stable, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Let M =N = {123}, let X = {x y z}, and let every pair of players be win-
ning, with preference orderings z 1 x 1 y, y 2 x ∼2 z, and x ∼3 y 3 z. It is easy to
confirm that y P z, and that {xz} and {y} are weakly but not vNM stable. By contrast,
only {x y} is vNM stable. ♦
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The predictive power of weak stability, like vNM stability, depends on other parame-
ters of the model: there may be a unique and small weakly stable set (e.g., any Condorcet
winner); there may be a unique but large weakly stable set (e.g., every division of the pie
in two-player bargaining games; see Example 2 below); there may be several weakly sta-
ble sets (e.g., in three-player divide the pie bargaining: cf. Ordeshook 1986, Chapter 9.2);
and no weakly stable set need exist (e.g., in the Condorcet paradox example). Finally, it
is readily checked that under our assumptions, a weakly stable set may contain weakly
Pareto dominated policies and the closure of a weakly stable set is itself weakly stable.
We end this subsection with some additional notation. For any binary relation Q on
X , x ∈ X , and any subset Z ⊆ X , we use the notation Q(x) ≡ {y ∈ X :y Q x}, QZ(x) ≡
{y ∈Z :y Q x}, and M(QZ)≡ {y ∈Z :∀y ′ ∈Z \ {y} y ′ Q y implies y Q y ′}.
3.2 The algorithm
We now turn to our main purpose in this section, which is to describe an algorithmic
procedure that is capable of finding the set of possible equilibrium policy outcomes
from any initial default x0 ∈X .
Our procedure starts with a weakly stable set V ∈ V and an initial default x ∈ X . It
then constructs a tree Tπ(V x) inductively in (at most) mx steps, starting with step mx
and then continuing in decreasing order. The initial node of Tπ(V x) is always x. Step
mx consists of the construction—to be detailed below—of the set of immediate succes-
sors of x, which is denoted by sπmx(V x). If the latter is empty, then the algorithm ends:
the tree has a single node. Otherwise, we proceed inductively, moving backward from
the k+ 1th step to the kth step the same way. For each element yk+1 of sπk+1(V  yk+2),
we construct the set of immediate successors of yk+1, denoted by sπk (V  yk+1). As previ-
ously, the algorithm ends if this set is empty: yk+1 is then the last node of a path of length
mx − k+ 1 (i.e., with mx − k+ 1 edges). The algorithm necessarily ends when we reach
Step 1, so that no path in the tree has more than mx edges.
We now explain how the successor nodes of x in Tπ(V x)—the sπk (V  yk+1)’s—are
constructed.
Case 1. If x ∈ V , then the mx steps of the procedure are trivial: the tree has a single
path of length mx in which all nodes are equal to x; that is,
sπk (V x)= {x} for all k= 1    mx
Case 2. If x /∈ V , then the successors of x in the tree are obtained in up to mx steps
k=mxmx − 1    1:
• k = mx: Recall that PV (x) is the set of policies in V that P-dominate x
and that RV (x) is the set of policies in V that R-dominate x. For each
subset Y ⊆ RV (x) (including ∅), we can determine the (possibly empty)
set of policies that are ideal for the last proposer in PV (x) ∪ {x} ∪ Y :
M(πx(mx)PV (x)∪ {x} ∪Y). The set of immediate successors of x is then
obtained by taking the union of all such sets:
sπmx(V x)=
⋃
Y⊆RV (x)
M(πx(mx)PV (x)∪ {x} ∪Y)
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If sπmx(V x)=∅, then the procedure stops.6
• 1 ≤ k ≤ mx − 1: If the procedure has not stopped before step k + 1
(i.e., there is a sequence yk+1 yk+2     ymx+1 such that ymx+1 = x and
yl ∈ sπl (V  yl+1) for each l = kk + 1    mx), then the set of immediate
successors of yk+1 is
sπk (V  yk+1)=
⋃
Y⊆RV (yk+1)
M(πx(k)PV (yk+1)∪ {yk+1} ∪Y)
If sπk (V  yk+1)=∅, then the procedure stops.
Now suppose the tree Tπ(V x) has paths of lengths mx (i.e., the procedure has
reached k = 1). The set of outcomes of our algorithm, denoted by Fπ(V x), is defined
as the set of terminal nodes of its paths of length mx that belong to V . Put formally,
y ∈ Fπ(V x) if and only if there exists a sequence (y1     ymx+1) such that y1 = y ∈ V ,
ymx+1 = x, and yk ∈ sπk (V  yk+1) for each k= 1    mx. Observe that, by construction, if
x ∈ V , then we must have Fπ(V x)= {x}. As Fπ(V x) is by definition a subset of V , this
implies that
⋃
x∈X Fπ(V x)= V . If Tπ(V x) has no path of length mx (i.e., the procedure
stopped before k= 1), then our algorithm has no outcome.
Observe that the tree construction greatly simplifies if the policy space is well or-
dered. Indeed, RV (x) = PV (x) ∪ {x} for every policy x ∈ X . As V is assumed to be P-
internally stable—so that PV (x)=∅ for all x ∈ V —this implies that the set of immediate
successors of any node yk+1 ∈ V is yk+1 itself:
sπk (V  yk+1)=M(πx(k)PV (yk+1)∪ {yk+1})=M(πx(k) {yk+1})= {yk+1}
Applying the same logic recursively thus shows that all successors of node yk+1 ∈ V are
equal to yk+1: yl = yk+1 for all l = 1    k+ 1. We will return to the special case of well
ordered X throughout the paper.
Before we proceed any further, it may be helpful to illustrate this construction by
exploiting Example 1 above.
Example 1 continued. Suppose that the initial default is x0 = y, and that the pro-
tocol is defined as πw(i) = i for all w ∈ {x y z} and all i ∈ M : in words, players pro-
pose in the order 1, 2, 3 at every default. The tree Tπ({xz} y) is depicted in Figure 1;
recall that {xz} is a weakly stable set. The set of immediate successors of the initial
node, y, is sπ3 ({xz} y) = {x y}. Indeed, P{xz}(y) = ∅ and R{xz}(y) = {x}. As player 3 is
the last proposer, the definition of sπ3 ({xz} y) implies that sπ3 ({xz} y) =M(3 {y}) ∪
M(3 {x y}) = {y} ∪ {x y} = {x y} (recall that x and y are player 3’s ideal policies).
Following the dashed path in Figure 1, consider now the set of immediate successors
of node x ∈ sπ3 ({xz} y). Note first that P{xz}(x) = ∅ and R{xz}(x) = {xz}. Hence,
given that player 2 is the second proposer, sπ2 ({xz}x) = M(2 {x}) ∪ M(2 {xz}) =
{x} ∪ {xz} = {xz} (proposer 2 is indifferent between the two policies in {xz}). Finally,
6The tree sπmx(V x) may indeed be empty when V is not closed.
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Figure 1. Tree Tπ({xz} y).
the set of immediate successors of node x ∈ sπ2 ({xz}x) is sπ1 ({xz}x) = M(1 {x}) ∪
M(1 {xz})= {x} ∪ {z} = {xz}: x and z are final nodes of tree Tπ({xz} y). This com-
pletes the description of the dotted paths in Figure 1. One could apply the same proce-
dure and intuition to the other paths of Tπ({xz} y), so as to obtain Fπ({xz} y)= {xz}
(recall that Fπ({xz} y) only selects the terminal nodes that belong to {xz}). ♦
3.3 The equilibrium correspondence
We will now use the tree construction to characterize the equilibrium correspondence.
Our first result states that the construction of tree Tπ(V x0), and therefore of Fπ(V x0),
generates equilibrium policies of game (πx0).
Proposition 1. Suppose that V is the closure of a weakly stable set, and let g ∈ V X be
a selection of Fπ(V  ·): g(x) ∈ Fπ(V x) for all x ∈X . There exists an equilibrium σ such
that fσ(x)= g(x) for all x ∈X . Hence,⋃x∈X fσ(x)= V .
This proposition says that if V is the closure of a weakly stable set (and is therefore
a weakly stable set itself), then any selection g(·) of Fπ(V  ·) is an equilibrium outcome
of (πx0).7 Put differently, Proposition 1 says that the final nodes of length-mx paths
in tree Tπ(V x) are equilibrium policy outcomes of continuation games starting with x
as the initial default. In particular, all policies in Fπ(V x0) are equilibrium outcomes
of (πx0). Thus, Proposition 1 implies that the closure of any weakly stable set V is
“immovable” in the sense that there is an equilibrium σ of (πx0) such that the union
of fσ(x) over x ∈X is V ; that is, exactly the initial defaults in V are not amended in that
equilibrium. We will say that the equilibrium supports V in such a case. We assume that
V is the closure of a weakly stable set to ensure that Fπ(V x) is nonempty: if V is not
closed, then the set M(πx(k)PV (yk+1)∪ {yk+1} ∪Y) may be empty.
7Inspection of the proof of reveals that this is actually true for all V ∈ V that satisfy Fπ(V x) =∅ for every
x ∈X (even if V is not closed).
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Inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that these equilibria have a no-delay
property: a policy in V is implemented in no more than two rounds. The intuition be-
hind the construction of these equilibria is as follows. Let x /∈ V be the ongoing default
in a given round t and let (y1     ymx+1), with y1 = y ∈ V , be a path of tree Tπ(V x).
Suppose that all players believe that policies in V and only these policies are immov-
able: if a policy outside V is voted up and becomes the new default, then it will be
amended to a policy in V , which will never be amended. Hence, when considering
possible amendments to the current default x /∈ V , proposers only consider policies
in V . Suppose that the mxth proposer, πx(mx), is given the opportunity to make a pro-
posal in this round. The set of policies she can induce includes the default x (if she
passes, the unamended default will be implemented) and the set of policies in V that
winning coalitions are willing to accept—her “acceptance set” to use the language of
the previous literature. The latter set must include PV (x). Indeed, if an offer y in V
is accepted, then it will be implemented; if it is rejected, then x will be implemented.
In any subgame equilibrium, voters who strictly prefer y to x must therefore vote yes.
Voters who are indifferent between x and y may vote either yes or no. Thus, the last
proposer’s acceptance set is of the form PV (x) ∪ Y , where the set Y ⊆ RV (x) describes
the voting behavior of indifferent voters. For instance, a situation where indifferent vot-
ers always vote no can be described by setting Y = ∅, while a situation where indiffer-
ent voters always vote yes can be described by setting Y = RV (x). As V satisfies (ESR),
there must exist a nonempty Y ⊆ RV (x) and, therefore, a nonempty acceptance set for
the last proposer. In our equilibrium construction, Y is such that ymx is the proposer’s
ideal policy in PV (x) ∪ Y ∪ {x}: ymx ∈ M(πx(mx)PV (x) ∪ Y ∪ {x}) ⊆ sπmx(V x), where
ymx = x stands either for pass or for a proposal outside the acceptance set (which is
then voted down). It is consequently optimal for her to choose ymx . Now consider the
(mx − 1)th proposer’s choice. She faces the same problem as the mxth proposer, ex-
cept that x must be replaced by ymx : players anticipate that if the (mx − 1)th proposer’s
proposal is rejected, then ymx will be the final policy outcome. Hence, her acceptance
set is of the form PV (ymx) ∪ Y , where Y ⊆ RV (ymx) is such that she optimally chooses
ymx−1 ∈ M(πx(mx−1)PV (ymx) ∪ Y ∪ {ymx}) ⊆ sπmx−1(V  ymx). Moving backward, we can
repeatedly apply the same reasoning to all proposers until the first, πx(1), whose choice
y1 is in Fπ(V x)⊆ V .
Now suppose that the ongoing default x belongs to V . Voters anticipate that amend-
ing x to any other policy y will eventually lead to the implementation of a policy xy in V .
In our equilibrium, proposers only make and voters only accept a proposal y if they
strictly prefer xy to x. As V satisfies (ISP ), every coalition S ∈W contains a player who
weakly prefers x to xy . This makes any proposal y unsuccessful, so that each proposer
k optimally passes (i.e., she chooses yk(x)= x). This confirms players’ beliefs (assumed
at the start of the previous paragraph) that policies in V are immovable, thus complet-
ing the description of the equilibrium. As the same construction applies in any round t,
and, in particular, in round 1, this equilibrium is no-delay.
Proposition 1 prompts the following question: Can there be equilibria of (πx0)
(including equilibria with delay) whose outcomes do not belong to Fπ(V x0)? The next
proposition answers this question in the negative.
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Proposition 2. If σ is an equilibrium of (πx0), then there exists V ∈ V such that
fσ(x) ∈ Fπ(V x) for all x ∈X . Hence, V =⋃x∈X fσ(x).
To prove Propositions 1 and 2, we establish stronger results. First, weak stability of
V implies that, for every x ∈ X and every length-mx path (x ymx(x)     y1(x)) of tree
Tπ(V x) with y1(x) ∈ V , there exists an equilibrium σ such that fσ(xk) = yk(x) for
each k ∈ {1    mx}. Second, for every equilibrium σ of (πx0) and every x ∈X , there
exists a weakly stable set V and a length-mx path (x ymx(x)     y1(x)) of T
π(V x), with
y1(x) ∈ V , such that yk(x) = fσ(xk) for each k ∈ {1    mx}. Thus, the construction
of trees associated with weakly stable sets also provides a complete characterization of
equilibrium behavior both on and off equilibrium paths.
Propositions 1 and 2 jointly yield a complete characterization of the set of policy out-
comes that can be reached from any particular default policy x0 ∈X . We prove Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 (and subsequent propositions) in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that the game only has an equilibrium if there is a weakly sta-
ble set, and, as noted above, even games with a finite, well ordered policy space may
not have a weakly stable set. Nonexistence might be addressed by weakening our solu-
tion concept. We will consider the implications of history-dependent strategies in Sec-
tion 5.2.
Propositions 1 and 2 also have a number of technical implications that will prove
useful below. We end this subsection by detailing these properties.
Corollary 1. Let ∗(πx0) be the set of equilibria of (πx0). The set of equilibrium
policy outcomes in (πx0) is given by⋃
σ∈∗(πx0)
f σ(x0)=
⋃
V ∈V
Fπ(V x0)
An immediate implication of this result is that the set of policy outcomes that can
result from all equilibria and from all initial defaults is the union of all weakly stable
sets. Put differently, a policy in X can be obtained as the policy outcome of the bargain-
ing game from some initial default if and only if it belongs to some weakly stable set.
This does not mean, however, that determining the equilibrium policies of a given game
(πx0) boils down to determining the class of weakly stable sets: the set of equilibrium
policies of (πx0),
⋃
V ∈V Fπ(V x0), may be a strict subset of the union of weakly sta-
ble sets. In most cases, Fπ(V x0) only selects a strict subset of the elements of V , this
selection depending on the initial default x0 and on the protocol π.
Our analysis above reveals that there may be equilibrium multiplicity at two levels
in the bargaining game (for a given protocol π). First, Proposition 1 says that any weakly
stable set can be supported by an equilibrium. The possible multiplicity of weakly stable
sets may thus be a source of equilibrium multiplicity. Second, Proposition 1 also implies
that, for a given weakly stable set V ∈ V , any terminal node of tree Tπ(V x0) is the policy
outcome of some equilibrium of (πx0). Hence, each weakly stable set may contain
several equilibrium policies.
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On the other hand, Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to provide sufficient conditions for
a unique equilibrium. In what follows, a policy is referred to as a Condorcet winner if
and only if it P-dominates every other policy in X .
Corollary 2. (a) The game (πx0) has a unique equilibrium outcome if there is a
unique weakly stable set andX is well ordered.
(b) The Condorcet winner (when it exists) is implemented in every equilibrium of
(πx0) for every x0 ∈X .
Both parts follow from our algorithm. If the premise of part (a) holds, then each
node in the tree has a unique successor, and any Condorcet winner must constitute the
unique weakly stable set. The premise of part (a) is sufficient, rather than necessary, as
our next example demonstrates.
Example 2. Consider a committee whose two members (i= 12) can divide a unit-sized
pie. Each player has one opportunity to propose in each round, with player 1 proposing
first. The committee operates with a unanimity quota: a proposal is only successful
if both players vote in favor. In other words, this is a standard two-player bargaining
problem, modified by our rules for ending the game.
The policy space consists of the initial default (x0), at which each player earns 0, and
any division of the whole pie; that is,
X = {(x1x2) ∈ [01]2 :x1 + x2 = 1} ∪ {x0}
This policy space is not well ordered because each player is indifferent between x0 and
a division that yields her none of the pie. Consequently, the premise of Corollary 2(a)
does not hold.
It is easy to confirm that there is a unique weakly stable set (V ), consisting of every
division of the pie. Corollary 1 therefore implies that every policy in V is immovable:
any policy (x1x2) ∈ V would be implemented in an equilibrium if it were the initial de-
fault. However, (πx0) has a unique equilibrium outcome, in which player 2 earns the
entire pie. To see this, consider first the proposal by player 2 (if she is given the oppor-
tunity to propose). Player 2’s acceptance set includes every policy (x1x2) ∈ V such that
x1 > 0 and x2 > 0 because x0 would be implemented unless successfully amended, and
the acceptance set only has a maximal element if player 1 accepts policy (01). Conse-
quently, player 2 would successfully propose (01)—her ideal policy—in any subgame
equilibrium. The unanimity quota and no discounting therefore imply that (01) is the
only policy that player 1 can successfully propose: player 2 would reject any other offer.
Hence, the second proposer (i.e., player 2) would earn the entire pie in any equilibrium
of (πx0). In particular, (πx0) has a unique equilibrium outcome, even though the
policy space is not well ordered. ♦
The collection of weakly stable sets in a game only depends on the protocol via M ,
the set of proposers. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that variations in the protocol do not
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affect the set of policies that can be implemented across initial defaults:⋃
x∈X
⋃
σ∈∗(πx)
f σ(x)=
⋃
x∈X
⋃
V ∈V
Fπ(V x)=
⋃
V ∈V
V 
However, variations in the order of proposers may affect the policies that can be imple-
mented from a given initial default: in Example 2, for instance, the player who proposes
second gets the entire pie, so switching the order of proposers changes the equilibrium
outcome.
Interestingly, the next result states that the set of policies that can be implemented
from a given default,
⋃
V ∈V Fπ(V x0), only depends on the protocol at the initial default:
πx0 . To see this, observe that, for any weakly stable set V and any initial default x
0, the
tree Tπ(V x0), and therefore the selection of terminal nodes Fπ(V x0), only depends
on πx0 . Indeed, the construction of the tree reveals that all equilibrium policies can be
reached in one bargaining round and, in that round, each proposer i ∈ M chooses her
ideal policies from a set that is independent of the protocol.
Corollary 3. Let π1 ≡ {π1x} and π2 ≡ {π2x} be two protocols. If π1x0 = π2x0 , then
Fπ
1
(V x0)= Fπ2(V x0)
Corollaries 1 and 3 thus jointly imply that the set of equilibrium policies only depends
on the protocol at the initial default. In all equilibria supporting V ∈ V , proposers and
voters anticipate in round 1 that policies in V , and only those policies, are immovable:
once reached, they must be implemented. In particular, each proposer k faces an ac-
ceptance set of the form Ak = PV (yk+1)∪ {yk+1} ∪Y , where yk+1 is the policy that will be
implemented if she fails to amend x0 and Y is some subset of RV (yk+1): any proposal
in Ak is accepted. If the kth proposer amends x0 in round 1, then the equilibrium path
must lead to the implementation of her ideal policy in Ak (which is independent of the
protocol). If protocols in future rounds (i.e., {πx}x =x0 ) induced equilibrium paths not
leading to the implementation of the kth proposer’s ideal policy in Ak, then she could
profitably deviate by offering this policy, which would be accepted, directly in round 1.
3.4 Some quirky properties of the equilibrium correspondence
In this subsection, we illustrate some interesting properties of the equilibria of (πx0)
via a couple of examples, which will also prove useful in subsequent sections.
Example 3. Suppose that M = N = {123} and that any two players can agree to any
division of a dollar: W =W = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ 2}. Take any point x¯ = (x¯1 x¯2 x¯3) in the
two-dimensional simplex ≡ {(x1x2x3) ∈ R3+ :x1 + x2 + x3 = 1} at which some player
(say, 1) earns less than 50 cents: x¯1 ≤ 12 . It is well known that
V (x¯1)= {x ∈  :x2 + x3 = 1− x¯1}
is a vNM (and therefore weakly) stable set: cf. Ordeshook (1986, Chapter 9.2), so the
union of weakly stable sets for this game is the entire simplex. This would remain true
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if we changed M to {12}: W—and therefore V—remains unchanged as long as at least
two players can propose. Combined with Proposition 1, this observation implies that a
player who cannot propose may nevertheless earn the entire dollar in some equilibrium
of a game whose initial default is no agreement (x0 = (000)). By contrast, a player who
cannot propose earns 0 in Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) closed rule model and in their
open rule game with patient enough players. Furthermore, any policy in the interior of
the triangle may be implemented in an equilibrium. Specifically, suppose (without loss
of generality) that x¯ belongs to the interior of the simplex and that players propose in
the order 1, 2, 3 at every default. Using tree Tπ(x0 V (x¯1)), it is readily checked that there
is an equilibrium in which, at the initial default, the following situation occurs.
• Player 3 (the last proposer) would propose (x¯101− x¯1), player 2 would propose
(x¯11− x¯10), and player 1 (the first proposer) proposes x¯.
• The first proposal is accepted: players 1 and 3 vote in favor of x, while player 2
votes against any proposal y such that y2 ≤ 1− x¯1.
The first proposal is successful in this equilibrium, and it secures the votes of exactly
two players. A minimal winning coalition forms at the voting stage, yet the three players
each earn a share of the dollar. ♦
Example 1 continued. In the last subsection, we constructed tree Tπ({xz} y) for Ex-
ample 1 when players propose in the order 1, 2, 3. Two of the paths in Figure 1 have z as
a terminal node. Proposition 1 then implies that (πy) has an equilibrium in which z
is implemented. Preferences in this example imply that y P-dominates z. We therefore
conclude that a committee can implement a policy that is P-dominated by the initial
default. Inspection of Example 1 reveals that this property relies on the supposition that
some players are indifferent between policies, which allows policies in the weakly stable
set to be amended. Indeed, Proposition 3 below will imply that the implemented policy
must R-dominate the initial default if the policy space is well ordered. ♦
We record the arguments in this subsection as follows.
Observation 1. (a) A player who does not propose may nevertheless earn all of the sur-
plus from agreement.
(b) All players in a majority-rule divide-the-dollar game may earn a positive surplus
in equilibrium.
(c) The members of some winning coalitionmay all strictly prefer the initial default x0
to the final policy outcome.
4. Comparative statics
In this section, we consider how variations in the model’s parameters affect the poli-
cies that are implemented from any initial default. In Section 4.1, we explore the effect
of changing the protocol on the policies implemented in a given weakly stable set. In
Section 4.2, we focus on the implications of changes in the set of weakly stable sets.
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4.1 The protocol (“the power of the penultimate word”)
Thus far, we have studied play in games with a fixed protocol. In this subsection, we
study situations in which a player, the chair, chooses a protocol π after observing the
initial default x0 and the game (πx0) is then played. As the chair’s choice of protocols
only affects her payoff via πx0 (Corollary 3), the chair cannot improve on selecting a
protocol that is constant across X .8 Hence, we can without loss of generality restrict
attention to constant protocols.
The chair’s choice depends on her expectation of behavior in (πx0) and, therefore,
on her predictions of equilibrium policies in that game for every protocol π. Though the
potential multiplicity of equilibria makes the comparative statics analysis of equilibrium
policies delicate, the following result allows us to draw general conclusions about the
chair’s preferences over protocols in the well ordered case.
Proposition 3. If X is well ordered, then for every equilibrium σ of (πx0) and any
x /∈ fσ(X),
fσ(x)=M(π(k)R(x)∩ fσ(X))
where k≡max{l ∈ {1    mx} :M(π(l)R(x)∩ fσ(X))π(l) x}.
In Proposition 3, the kth proposer is the last proposer among those who have an
incentive to amend the ongoing default x in equilibrium σ : namely those who strictly
prefer some policy in their acceptance set to the default. We will refer to any such pro-
poser as an amender of x. Proposition 3 says that the ideal policy in R(x) ∩ V of the last
amender according to π is implemented in every equilibrium σ ∈ ∗(πx0) that sup-
ports V .
Take any fixed protocol in which the chair is not the last proposer and consider some
equilibrium σ of that game. Now consider a protocol in which the chair proposes last.
Proposition 3 implies that this game has an equilibrium in which the chair is at least as
well off and is better off if she is an amender of x. The relevant equilibrium supports
the same weakly stable set as σ so existence of an equilibrium in the first game implies
existence of an equilibrium when the chair proposes last.
Proposition 3 does not imply that the chair cannot lose if she changes to a protocol
in which she proposes last because there may be several weakly stable sets and, there-
fore, a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. However, we can strengthen results in the
last paragraph if there is a unique weakly stable set (say, V ); so Corollary 2 implies that
there is a unique equilibrium policy for every protocol. In such cases, there is room
for protocol manipulation, except in the rather unlikely case where all amenders of x0
share the same ideal policy among those in R(x0)∩V . Furthermore, proposing last is an
advantageous position in the following sense.
8Corollary 3 also applies in a different “dynamic” game where the chair selects the next proposer im-
mediately after each vote that does not end the game (see Section A in the supplementary file for a formal
proof).
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• If the chair is an amender of x0, then she can never improve on any protocol in
which she proposes last: she is at least as well off when she proposes last as when
she proposes earlier.
• If the chair is not an amender of x0, then she does not lose anything by selecting
herself as the last proposer: if another protocol is optimal for her, then there is a
protocol in which she proposes last that is also optimal.
Do the conclusions above carry over to cases in which the policy space is not well
ordered? As the next example reveals, the answer is no, even if there is a unique weakly
stable set: a chair who is an amender can improve on a protocol in which she is the last
proposer.
Example 4. Let M =N = {123456} and X = {xv1 v2 v3}. Preferences over X are
given by v3 1 v2 ∼1 v1 1 x, v2 2 v1 2 x 2 v3, x 3 v2 3 v3 3 v1, x 4 v3 4 v2 4 v1,
v3 ∼5 v1 5 x 5 v2, and v1 6 x 6 v2 6 v3. Assume that preferences are aggregated by
majority rule: W is the collection of majority coalitions. It is easily checked that the
unique weakly stable set here is V = {v1 v2 v3}.
Suppose the initial default is x0 = x. Consider first a protocol π1 in which players
1 and 2 are the penultimate and last proposers, respectively. If player 2 were given the
opportunity to make the last proposal in the first round, then she would amend the de-
fault x with v1: v1 is the only policy in V that P-dominates (and is not P-dominated by)
x and v1 2 x. If player 1 were given the opportunity to make the penultimate proposal,
then voters would only vote yes if they preferred player 1’s proposal to v1. Assuming
that indifferent voters vote yes, player 1 would successfully propose her ideal policy in
R(v1) ∩ V = V , which is v3. Since no policy in V \ {v3} R-dominates v3 (except v3 it-
self), proposers who appear before player 2 in protocol π1 cannot prevent v3 from being
implemented (using the language of the tree, all successor nodes of v3 are equal to v3).
Thus, the worst policy of the last amender of x is implemented in equilibrium.
Now consider another protocol, say π2, in which players 2 and 1 are the penultimate
and last proposers, respectively. Using the same argument as in the previous paragraph,
one can show that v2 is the unique equilibrium policy when indifferent voters vote yes.
Thus, if player 2 is the chair (and she anticipates that indifferent voters accept propos-
als), then she strictly prefers protocol π2 to protocol π1.9 By the same logic, she strictly
prefers any protocol in which she makes the last two proposals to π1: the chair’s ideal
policy is also implemented by such a protocol. ♦
This example shows that when the policy space is not well ordered, two options
exist.
(i) The chair may optimally choose to make the last two proposals, thereby strictly
improving on a protocol in which she only proposes last.10
9If she anticipates that indifferent voters reject proposals, then she is indifferent between π1 and π2, for
v1 is the unique equilibrium policy in both cases.
10This result should not be confused with Diermeier and Fong’s (2011) demonstration that a single pro-
poser is at least as well off making a take it or leave it offer as playing their game.
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(ii) The chair may optimally choose to (only) make the penultimate proposal, thereby
strictly improving on a protocol in which she only proposes last. This contrasts
with the “power of the last word” in Bernheim et al. (2006), which we elaborate on
in Section 6.1.
We summarize the discussion above as follows.
Observation 2. Suppose that there is a unique weakly stable set. If the policy space is
well ordered, then the chair is at least as well off proposing last as in any other protocol.
However, if the policy space is not well ordered, then the chair may prefer to make the last
two or the penultimate proposals over only proposing last.
4.2 The set of winning coalitions
Thus far, we have considered how varying the protocol affects play for a given set of
weakly stable sets. In this subsection, we explore the effects of changing the set of win-
ning coalitions and, thereby, the weakly stable sets. We consider two reasons why the
winning coalitions might change: in Section 4.2.1, we study the effects of increasing the
quota; in Section 4.2.2, we consider how changing the number of proposers affects play.
4.2.1 Quotas In conventional bargaining models with spatial preferences on the real
line, an increase in the quota makes voters with more extreme preferences decisive. The
committee can only amend a default if the decisive voters agree, so committees with
a greater quota have a larger gridlock interval. Black (1958, p. 99) made the following
proposal:
The larger the size of majority needed to arrive at a new decision on a topic, the smaller
will be the likelihood of the committee selecting a decision that alters the existing state of
affairs.
We will discuss this conjecture in the context of our model with an arbitrary policy space.
We say that (πx0) is a quota game if the collection of winning coalitions (of vot-
ers) W is of the form Ws ≡ {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ s} with s ≥ (n+ 1)/2. Our goal is thus to study
how the set of equilibrium policies of a quota game is affected by an increase in the
quota. Given the collection of winning coalitions (of voters) Ws, we can define the cor-
responding social preference relations Rs and Ps , and the corresponding collection of
weakly stable sets Vs as we did in Section 3. In light of our characterization results,
Black’s conjecture above can be reformulated as q > r implies that
⋃Vr ⊆⋃Vq (where⋃Vs ≡ {v ∈X :v ∈ V for some V ∈ Vs}). In other words, an increase in the quota (weakly)
expands the union of immovable policies. We will refer to this property as conventional
wisdom.
It is easy to show that conventional wisdom holds if there is enough conflict of in-
terest so that X is a weakly stable set or if there is enough common interest that there
is a Condorcet winner (which must be the only weakly stable set) with the higher quota.
On the other hand, conventional wisdom would fail if some policy is in a weakly stable
set if and only if the quota is lower. We provide an example below with a finite, well or-
dered policy space that satisfies the stronger property that
⋃Vq ⊂⋃Vr : an increase in
the quota contracts the union of immovable policies.
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The intuition for this result is that an increase in the quota makes it easier for a given
set of policies to satisfy internal stability, but more difficult for that set to satisfy external
stability. However, this intuition does not fully explain the result because the union of
weakly stable sets is not necessarily weakly stable.
Example 5. LetM =N = {123456}, X = {wx y z}, andwi xi y i z for i= 12,
y i z i w i x for i= 34, z 5 w 5 x5 y, and x6 y 6 z 6 w. Suppose first that the
quota is 4. Applying the definition of weakly stable sets, it is readily checked that there
are two weakly stable sets in this case—{wy} and {xz}—so⋃V4 =X . Note that x and
z cannot form a weakly stable set with w and y because the internal stability condition,
(ISP4 ), would fail: w P
4 x, z P4 w, x P4 y, and y P4 z.
Now suppose that the quota becomes 5. As wP5 x and y P5 z, internal stability (ISP5 )
does not allow for more weakly stable sets than before the increase in the quota. Further-
more, the increase in the quota implies that {xz} no longer satisfies external stability:
while z P4w and xP4 y, ¬(z P5w) and ¬(xP5 y). As a result, {wy} is now the only weakly
stable set (as w and y P5-dominate x and z, respectively). Thus, conventional wisdom
fails in this example in the strong sense that an increase in the quota contracts the union
of immovable policies: {wy} =⋃V5 ⊂⋃V4 =X . ♦
We summarize the arguments above in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (πx0) is a quota game. An increase in the quota weakly
expands the set of equilibrium decisions if there is a Condorcet winner or ifX is a weakly
stable set for the higher quota. However, an increase in the quota may contract the set of
equilibrium decisions in other cases.
Black’s conjecture underlies a series of reforms in the EU, which introduced qualified
majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers to expedite legislation. Our analysis
above suggests an alternative perspective: if Council proceedings corresponded to our
model, then introduction of QMV might, perversely, have prevented the Council from
amending the initial default. This may help to explain why the introduction of QMV has
not significantly reduced the 80% of legislation that the Council has passed without a
final vote: cf. Heisenberg (2005).
4.2.2 Adding proposers It is widely believed that players can never lose if they are given
the opportunity to propose: for a proposer could always make an offer that will be re-
jected. This argument has been influential, for example, in the design of regulatory
agencies, which are required to include stakeholders in their decision making process;
and the argument is correct in our model for any fixedweakly stable set. However, adding
a proposer can change the set of coalitions in W and, thereby, the weakly stable sets.
Consequently, as we argue below, a player may be worse off if she is given the opportu-
nity to propose.
We will henceforth focus on the special case where there is initially a single proposer
(say, player 1), both for expositional convenience and so as to compare our results with
Diermeier and Fong (2011), who show that the single proposer may be worse off when
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she has the opportunity to propose in several rounds than when she proposes once in a
model with repeated implementation. This property is clearly impossible in our model:
on the one hand, adding another proposal by player 1 does not change the set of weakly
stable sets; on the other hand, player 1 could pass at her first opportunity to propose.
Indeed, Example 4 above demonstrates that a player may prefer to make the last two
proposals than just the last proposal in each round. The same argument implies that
the set of policies that can be implemented in some equilibrium is unchanged by adding
another proposer (say, player 2) with the same preferences as player 1.
Adding a proposer with different preferences from player 1 may affect play for vari-
ous reasons:
• In Section 3.4, we used Example 3 to demonstrate that a player who does not pro-
pose may earn all of the surplus in an equilibrium. Adding another proposer does
not change the weakly stable sets and there are then equilibria in which the new
proposer earns less than all of the surplus.
• In Section 4.1, we demonstrated that, for given weakly stable sets, player 1 may be
better off if player 2 proposes before her, provided that X is not well ordered.
We will now demonstrate by example that adding a proposal by player 2 may make
player 1 better off and player 2 worse off because of changes in the weakly stable sets,
even if X is well ordered, and there is a unique weakly stable set for each set of proposers
(so that each associated game has a unique equilibrium policy).
Example 6. Let N = {12345} and X = {wx y z}. Preferences over X are given by
z 1 y 1 w 1 x, x 2 y 2 z 2 w, z 3 w 3 x 3 y, w 4 x 4 y 4 z, and x 5 w 5
y 5 z. Assume that the initial default is x0 = x and that defaults are amended by major-
ity rule: W is the collection of majority coalitions.
Suppose first that player 1 is the only proposer (i.e., M = {1}). This implies that W
is the collection of majority coalitions that include 1: W = {S ∈ W : 1 ∈ S}. It is readily
checked that the unique weakly stable set here is V = {x y z}. Proposition 2 then implies
that x is the unique equilibrium policy. Intuitively, since no policy in V is preferred to x
by a majority coalition, it is impossible for 1 to amend it. Consequently, the proposer’s
worst policy must be implemented.
Now suppose that player 2 is given the opportunity to make a proposal after player 1,
so that the set of proposers becomes M ′ = {12}. The collection of winning coalitions
W ′ = {S ∈ W : {12} ∩ S = ∅}, thus yielding a unique weakly stable set V ′ = {wy}. The
second (and last) proposer, player 2, would never amend the initial default x, which
is her ideal policy, in equilibrium. Anticipating this, voters accept the first proposer’s
proposal if and only if they prefer the latter to x. Player 1 will, therefore, amend x to her
ideal policy in R(x) ∩ V ′, which is w. This implies that w, player 2’s worst policy in X ,
is now the unique equilibrium policy. In contrast, player 1 is now strictly better off, as
w1 x. ♦
Examples in which a player may be worse off when given the opportunity to pro-
pose are easy to concoct in final voting games with a finite horizon. In such games, the
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intuition is simple. The last amender cannot commit to pass. Her predecessor may,
therefore, amend the default to the last amender’s disadvantage, knowing that the latter
would otherwise amend the default. In Example 6, however, the logic is different: for the
initial default, x is player 2’s ideal policy and, therefore, player 1 does not expect her to
amend it.
The problem for player 2 is that she cannot commit to pass at all possible defaults.
Adding player 2 to the set of proposers changes the P-dominance relation and, conse-
quently, the set of immovable policies that player 1 can successfully propose in equilib-
rium. In particular, player 1’s ideal policy z, which was initially immovable, would now
be amended to y by player 2 (off the equilibrium path). This in turn makes player 2’s
worst policy w immovable: changing w to z would lead to y being implemented, thus
making a majority of voters (i.e., players 4, 5, and 6) worse off. Moreover, w is the only
immovable policy that is majority preferred to the initial default x. In the first round, it
is thus optimal for player 1 to propose w, which is accepted and never amended.
We record the conclusion from this example as follows.
Observation 3. A player may be strictly worse off if she is given the opportunity to
propose.
Corporate governance reform often aims to extend shareholders’ scope to propose
policies. Opponents (e.g., the Business Roundtable) argue that it is disadvantageous to
give such power to uninformed shareholders. Observation 3 shows that this property
may also hold when shareholders are informed.11 This is consistent with evidence that
allowing shareholders to propose has a negative and/or insignificant effect on share-
holder value. (See, for example, Akyol et al. 2012 and Larcker et al. 2011 on proxy access.)
5. Extensions
5.1 Implementation
According to the model analyzed above, payoffs only depend on the policy (if any) that is
eventually implemented, at which point the game ends. In this subsection, we consider
a variant of (πx0) in which the bargaining process continues ad infinitum. At the
end of each round t ∈ N, default policy xt is implemented and each player i receives an
instantaneous payoff (1− δ)ui(xt), where δ ∈ (01) is the common discount factor and
ui ∈ RX is a continuous utility function that represents i: Assumption A0 guarantees
that such a utility function exists. Thus, player i’s payoff from a sequence of defaults
{xt}∞t=1 is (1 − δ)
∑∞
t=1 δt−1ui(xt). We will refer to such a game as δ(πx0) and will say
that an equilibrium of δ(πx0) is absorbing if there is a round T such that xt = xT for
every subsequent round: t > T . We abuse terminology in this subsection by identifying
equilibria in our model with equilibria in the related model with continued (but payoff-
irrelevant) bargaining.
11The proposal that is put to the AGM for a final vote is typically negotiated by shareholders and man-
agement prior to the meeting. Our model refers to these negotiations, rather than to the final vote itself.
466 Anesi and Seidmann Theoretical Economics 9 (2014)
For any fixed strategy combination, each player’s payoff in a repeated implementa-
tion model with a common discount factor δ  1 is close to that in the variant on our
model. This observation suggests that there is δ < 1 such that an equilibrium strategy
combination in our model (or, more precisely, in the related model) might be an equi-
librium in the repeated implementation model. Our next result confirms this intuition
in the finite, well ordered case.
Proposition 5. If X is finite and well ordered, then there exists δ¯ ∈ (01) such that the
following statement is true whenever δ > δ¯: σ is an equilibrium of (πx0) if and only if
it is an absorbing stationary Markov equilibrium of δ(πx0).
As δ becomes arbitrarily close to 1, player i’s discounted payoff from a (converging)
sequence of defaults {xt} becomes arbitrarily close to her instantaneous payoff from the
limit policy, say xT :
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt)→ ui(xT ) as δ→ 1
The assumption that X is finite and well ordered thus guarantees that there exists a suf-
ficiently large δ < 1 (δ¯) such that players evaluate sequences of defaults similarly in ab-
sorbing equilibria of δ(πx0) and (πx0): only final (or limit) policies matter. Put
differently, xi y if and only if player i strictly prefers any sequence of defaults converg-
ing to x to any sequence converging to y in the repeated implementation model. This
may not be true if X comprises a continuum, even though δ is close to 1 and x i y,
ui(x)− ui(y) may be so small that player i prefers the sequence of defaults leading to y
over that leading to x.
Furthermore, as the following example illustrates, Proposition 5 does not hold when
X is not well ordered.
Example 3 continued. Consider again the divide-the-dollar game in Example 3. Re-
call that the set of policies (x1x2x3) ∈  at which player 1 earns 50 cents, V ( 12), is a
weakly stable set. From Proposition 1, therefore, there are equilibria of (πx0) that
support V ( 12). In particular, the equilibrium σ constructed in the proof of Proposition 1
prescribes the committee to implement a policy in V ( 12) without delay: in any subgame
starting with an ongoing default x /∈ V ( 12), x is amended to some vx ∈ V ( 12) in the first
round.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the value of δ, σ is not an equilibrium of δ(πx0). To
see this, consider a round in which the ongoing default is v0 ≡ ( 12 x2 12 − x2) ∈ V ( 12).
Suppose that player 1, if given the opportunity to amend v0, proposes y = ( 12 + 
/2
x2 − 
 12 − x2 + 
/2) for any small and positive 
. If player 1’s proposal were accepted,
then, by construction of σ , a policy vy ∈ R(y) ∩ V ( 12) would be implemented in all fu-
ture periods. As vy must R-dominate y, it must be of the form vy = ( 12 x2 − 
 + γ2
1
2 − x2 + 
/2+ γ3), where γi ≥ 0 and γ2 + γ3 = 
/2. Hence, players 1 and 3 receive higher
payoffs when they accept 1’s offer to amend v0 to y than when they reject it:
(1− δ)u1(y)+ δu1(vy)= 12(1+ (1− δ)
) > 12 = u1(v0)
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and
(1− δ)u3(y)+ δu3(vy)= 12(1+ 
)− x2 + δγ3 > 12 − x2 = u3(v0)
This proves that player 1 has a profitable deviation from σ1 and, therefore, that σ is not
an equilibrium of δ(πx0). ♦
5.2 History-dependent strategies
Our goal in this subsection is to study how the set of immovable policies is affected when
we extend the strategy set to strategies that are more history-dependent than stationary
Markov strategies. In particular, we observed in Section 3 that—as the archetypal exam-
ple of the Condorcet paradox illustrates—a weakly stable set, and, therefore, a stationary
Markov equilibrium, may not exist.
Our first step is to characterize equilibrium policy outcomes when strategies de-
pend on the entire sequence of previous defaults. To do so, we first need some defi-
nitions. We call a partial round-t history any list of defaults (x0x1     xt−1) such that
xt−1 = xt−2 (i.e., the game did not end in period t−1).12 Let Ht be the set of round-t par-
tial histories—H1 ≡ {x0} being the null history—and let H ≡⋃∞t=1Ht be the set of par-
tial histories. We define a semi-Markovian strategy as an analog of a stationary Markov
strategy where partial histories play the role of the ongoing default. More specifically, in
proposal stages, strategies only depend on the partial history and the identity of the re-
maining proposers in the current round; in voting stages, strategies only depend on the
partial history, the proposal just made, the votes already cast thereon, and the remain-
ing proposers in the current round. Our aim is to characterize semi-Markovian equilib-
ria, i.e., subgame perfect equilibria of (πx0) in which all players use semi-Markovian
strategies.
As in the case of stationary Markov strategies, we can now associate outcome func-
tions with semi-Markovian strategies. Any semi-Markovian strategy combinationσ gen-
erates an outcome function φσ , which assigns to every partial history h ∈ H and every
k ∈ {1    mxt−1} the unique final outcome φσ(hk) eventually implemented (given σ)
when h is the current partial history and the kth proposer is about to move. We are par-
ticularly interested in φσ(x01), which describes the policy implemented in (πx0) if
players act according to σ . We will sometimes abuse notation by writing φσ(x0) instead
of φσ(x01).
In Vartiainen’s (2012) framework, which we elaborate on in the next section, coali-
tional moves in each period t are dictated by “policy programs,” which may depend on
the entire sequence of previous defaults (x0     xt−1). He argues that in such a context,
the set of implementable policies must be a “consistent choice set”: A nonempty set of
policies Z ⊆X is a consistent choice set if, for any z ∈Z and for any x ∈X , there is z′ ∈Z
such that z′ ∈R(x) \ P(z). It turns out that the tree construction introduced in Section 3
can also be applied to consistent choice sets to obtain semi-Markovian equilibria. More
12A (complete) “history” at some stage of a given round t would describe all that has transpired in the pre-
vious rounds and stages (the sequence of proposers, their respective proposals, and the associated pattern
of votes).
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specifically, if Z is a consistent choice set, then each length-mx0 path of tree T(Zx
0)
ending with a policy in Z describes behavior in round 1 in some semi-Markovian equi-
librium. Hence, there exists a semi-Markovian equilibrium σ in which a policy in Z is
agreed on immediately: if the initial default x0 belongs to Z, it is implemented at the
end of round 1; otherwise, it is amended to some policy in Z that is implemented at the
end of round 2. Our next result mirrors Proposition 1.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Z is a consistent choice set and let g ∈ZX be any selection
of Fπ(Z ·): g(x) ∈ Fπ(Zx) for all x ∈ X . There exists a collection {σx}x∈X such that,
for all x ∈ X , σx is a semi-Markovian equilibrium of (πx) and φσx(x) = g(x). Hence,⋃
x∈X φσ
x
(x)=Z.13
The last part of the statement in the proposition says that, for any consistent choice
set Z and initial default x0, we can construct an equilibrium of (πx0), σ , such that the
final policy outcome reached from x0 must belong to Z. Inspection of the proof reveals
that more is true: the final policy outcome reached from any partial history h ∈H must
belong to Z; so that φσ(H)≡⋃h∈H φσ(h1)=Z.
Interestingly, Vartiainen (2012) establishes existence of a (nonempty) consistent
choice set. An immediate consequence of our results, therefore, is that a semi-
Markovian equilibrium exists in our game.14
Though every consistent choice set can be supported by a semi-Markovian equilib-
rium, the converse is not true; that is, it is generally not true that the set of immovable
policies in a semi-Markovian equilibrium is a consistent choice set ; Section B.4 in the
supplementary file provides a counterexample. Nevertheless, our next result states that
immovable policies form a consistent choice set whenever the policy space is well or-
dered and/or there is a single proposer in every round (as is usually assumed in the
literature on bargaining games with repeated implementation).
Proposition 7. Suppose that (at least) one of the following assumptions holds: (i) X is
well ordered; (ii) mx = 1 for all x ∈ X . If σ is a semi-Markovian equilibrium, then
φσ(H)≡⋃h∈H φσ(h1) is a consistent choice set.15
Thus, when X is well ordered or there is a single proposer, the set of policy out-
comes that can be reached from all possible partial histories in equilibrium is a consis-
tent choice set. Furthermore, we know from Proposition 6 that any policy z ∈ Z is the
outcome of a semi-Markovian equilibrium of (πz). Consequently, we have a corollary.
Corollary 4. Suppose that (at least) one of the following assumptions holds: (i) X is
well ordered; (ii) mx = 1 for all x ∈ X . The set of all semi-Markovian equilibrium policy
13The proof of Proposition 6 is similar to that of Proposition 1, so we provide the proof in Section B.1 of
the supplementary file.
14Vartiainen (2012) assumes that R is complete, but this assumption is not needed for the existence
result. We are grateful to him for discussing this point.
15We prove Proposition 7 in Section B.2 of the supplementary file because of similarities to the proof of
Proposition 2.
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outcomes that can be obtained from any initial default in X coincides with the union of
consistent choice sets.
One can add more history dependence by allowing strategies to depend not only
on the sequence of previous defaults, but also on the coalitions that amended pre-
vious defaults. Thus, a relevant history is now of the form (x0 S1x1     St−1xt−1),
where Ss ∈W stands for the winning coalition that amended xs−1 to xs . We prove in
the supplementary file (Section B.3) that, by doing so, we obtain analogs to Proposi-
tions 6 and 7 and Corollary 4 in which “quasi-consistent set” replaces “consistent choice
set.” A nonempty set of policies Z ⊆ X is quasi-consistent if and only if it satisfies the
following condition.16
(QC) We have z ∈Z only if, for all x ∈X and S ∈W , there exists z′ ∈Z∩R(x) such that
z i z′ for some i ∈ S.
Hence, if strategies are allowed to depend on both the sequence of previous defaults
and the coalitions that amended previous defaults, then (i) the closure of any quasi-
consistent set can be supported by an equilibrium and (ii) when X is well ordered or
there is a single proposer, the set of policy outcomes that can be reached from all possi-
ble partial histories in equilibrium is a quasi-consistent set.
5.3 Open rule bargaining
Thus far, we have focused on games that end when no proposer amends a default. We
have demonstrated that there is an equilibrium that supports the closure of any weakly
stable set and that every equilibrium supports a weakly stable set (Propositions 1 and 2).
Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) open rule model has a different stopping rule. Their game
only ends when a proposer successfully “moves the previous question”: putting the ex-
isting default to an up–down vote. In further contrast to our model, a new round starts at
default x if no proposer in {1    mx} has amended x or successfully moved x (the pre-
vious question). In this subsection, we argue that Proposition 1 holds, but that Proposi-
tion 2 fails in this variant on our model, which we dub open rule bargaining. (In contrast
to Baron and Ferejohn’s version, where proposers are selected at random, the protocol
determines the fixed order in which players propose in any round.)
We can prove the analog of Proposition 1 by constructing an equilibrium strategy
combination that supports any weakly stable set V .
If the default (x) is outside V , then it is R-dominated by some policy y∗(x) ∈ V , so let
any k ∈M who prefers y∗(x) over x propose the former and let any other proposer pass,
and if x ∈ V , then let every proposer move the previous question. To simplify subsequent
exposition, write y∗(x)= x whenever default x ∈ V . This means, in particular, that y∗(x)
is in V for any default x. We now turn to voting behavior. Suppose, first, that some
k ∈ M has proposed to amend x to y. If y = y∗(x), then let i vote for y if and only if
i weakly prefers y over x, and if y = y∗(x), then let i vote for y if and only if i strictly
16If “only if” is replaced by “if and only if” in condition (QC), then Z is a consistent set (Chwe 1994).
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prefers y∗(y) over y∗(x). Finally, if some k ∈ M has moved the previous question, then
i votes in favor if and only if i weakly prefers y∗(x) over x. It is easy to confirm that this
strategy combination forms an equilibrium, at which defaults in V are implemented,
and defaults outside V are amended to a policy in V that is then implemented.
The argument above implies that the constructed strategy combination supports V ,
by analogy to Proposition 1. Furthermore, any policy set supported by an equilibrium
must satisfy internal stability, else a proposer could profitably deviate to amending some
policy in the set. However, equilibria may support sets of policies that are not externally
stable. To see this, consider Example 2, where two players bargain over division of a pie.
The only weakly stable set is the set of divisions, but the following strategy combination
is an equilibrium. If the default (x) does not entail equal division of the pie ( 12 ) then a
player who gets less than 12 proposes amending x to
1
2 , while any other player passes,
and both players vote in favor when 12 is moved. Any player who gets less than
1
2 at y
vetoes amending x to y and also votes against if y is moved.
The following observation is a summary.
Observation 4. Any weakly stable set can be supported in an open rule bargaining
game, and the policy set supported by any equilibrium must satisfy internal stability.
However, there may be equilibria that support policy sets that fail external stability.
6. Related literature
The literature encompasses various approaches to modeling bargaining with an en-
dogenous default. Some papers explore the equilibrium correspondence of particular
noncooperative models of committee policy making. By contrast, papers in the ax-
iomatic tradition develop properties of bargaining that are robust to variations in the
procedure. Various papers provide noncooperative foundations for cooperative solu-
tion concepts. Our paper falls in the first of these categories, but our results also relate
to the literature on noncooperative foundations.
6.1 Noncooperative models of committee policy making
The literature on noncooperative bargaining with an endogenous default contains pa-
pers in which implementation is delayed until negotiations end and papers in which the
default is implemented each period. This paper, like Bernheim et al. (2006), focuses on
problems in the first category. However, in contrast to our model, Bernheim et al. (2006)
suppose that the policy space is finite and well ordered. The default is amended over a
finite number of rounds and the default at the end of the last round is implemented. Any
Condorcet winner of the original game is implemented if there are enough proposers or
at least one proposer top ranks the Condorcet winner. Bernheim et al. also show that
the last proposer’s ideal policy (her own project alone) is implemented in a pork barrel
example without a Condorcet winner. We allow for an infinite number of rounds, but
equilibria in our model with a well ordered policy space and a unique weakly stable set
also exhibit the power of the last word. The analogy between our results relies on our
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use of backward induction arguments which, in Bernheim et al.’s model, start with the
exogenously fixed last proposal. As some winning coalitions exclude players, the final
proposer can play off putative members of the winning coalition. Our argument, by
contrast, relies on our stopping rule: a default that is not amended by any proposer is
implemented, ending the game. Proposition 3, by contrast, allows for cases in which
only the grand coalition is winning, e.g., in variants on Example 2, where the pie can
only be split in a finite number of proportions. In further contrast to Bernheim et al., we
allow for an infinite policy space without requiring that it be well ordered. In such cases,
the chair may prefer not to propose last (cf. Observation 2).
Our model is also related to Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) open rule game, where ran-
domly selected proposers can amend the existing default. In contrast to Bernheim et al.
(2006), this game can last indefinitely, but, unlike our model, the game only ends when
a player proposes moving the previous question (viz. the current default). The differ-
ence in stopping rules is crucial, as many of our results rely on backward induction ar-
guments, which do not apply to open rule bargaining. We have also studied a version
of open rule bargaining that extends our model, but is not restricted to the distributive
problems that Baron and Ferejohn consider.17 We show that an immovable policy in
our model is also immovable in the open rule bargaining game, but that the converse
does not hold. In further contrast, patient players may all earn a share of the pie in
our model. This property fails in Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) closed rule game and the
open rule game with patient players, where the final vote satisfies the size principle, but
dissenting voters earn nothing.
Following Baron (1996), a recent literature has studied equilibria of games with re-
peated implementation. Each round ends with a final vote, but the game continues with
a new status quo/default. The most closely related paper is Acemoglu et al. (2012), which
essentially shares our game tree, but allows the set of winning coalitions to depend on
the default.18 Acemoglu et al. prove existence when social preferences are acyclic and
the policy space is finite, and demonstrate (in an online appendix) that the limiting poli-
cies constitute the unique vNM stable set and the largest consistent set.19 We focus on
characterization, rather than existence results, but explore a much larger class of policy
spaces that includes nonacyclic social preferences. Most of this literature supposes that
players discount future returns. Our main results concern games without discounting,
but we have shown that they also apply to games with repeated implementation, a finite
and well ordered policy space, and patient enough players.
Diermeier and Fong (2011) study a game with repeated implementation in which a
single player can propose (so the induced social preference relations are acyclic) and
the policy space is finite, but not necessarily well ordered. Their game form is, there-
fore, the same as a special case of our model. In contrast to our approach, Diermeier
17In this sense, our model also generalizes Volden and Wiseman’s (2007) variant on Baron and Ferejohn
(1989).
18Acemoglu et al. allow for some exogenous proposals (and exploit this possibility in their proofs).
19von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 657 prove existence and uniqueness of vNM stable sets under
Acemoglu et al.’s conditions. See Anesi and Seidmann (2012), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2011, 2012), and
Kalandrakis (2004, 2010) for existence results in related models.
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and Fong focus on equilibria in which an indifferent voter always votes in favor of the
proposal. This has important implications for predicted solutions, as instanced by their
benchmark case in which three players bargain over division of a pie. If any division
were feasible, then this game has a pair of weakly stable sets, in each of which the pro-
poser shares the pie exclusively with one of the other players. Any equilibrium outcome
in our model must lie in one of these sets. Diermeier and Fong’s tie-breaking rule elim-
inates both of these weakly stable sets, which immediately implies that any steady state
policy must give each player a share of the pie. We do not impose this tie-breaking rule,
so the size principle fails in our model for different reasons. Diermeier and Fong also
provide an existence proof for their game; von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) ar-
gument (cf. footnote 19) implies that our version of Diermeier and Fong’s game also has
a unique equilibrium.
Within the same strand of literature, but more distantly related, Duggan and Ka-
landrakis (2012) study pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibria of an infinite-
horizon model of legislative policy making with an evolving default. They establish equi-
librium existence and derive conditions under which proposers form minimal winning
coalitions. In contrast to our framework with no uncertainty, however, they assume that
players’ preferences and the default are subject to random shocks. Other related pa-
pers in this literature include Baron (1996), Baron and Herron (2003), Kalandrakis (2004,
2010), Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008), Dziuda and Loeper (2010), Duggan and Kalan-
drakis (2011), Zápal (2011), Battaglini and Palfrey (2012), Anesi (2012), and Battaglini
et al. (2012).
Our assumption that the default can be amended recalls a literature (surveyed by
Austen-Smith and Banks 2005) in which players vote successively over a finite, well or-
dered agenda. (Our algorithmic approach highlights the similarities.) This literature has
largely focused on successive elimination and amendment agendas, in which a default
is implemented when it (respectively) beats the next contender and all subsequent con-
tenders. Duggan (2006) is related most closely to our paper. He assumes that players first
add policies to an amendment agenda according to some protocol and then the com-
mittee votes over the agenda, so the agenda is endogenous in our sense.20 In contrast,
our model integrates proposing and voting: a given policy may be repeatedly placed on
the agenda, which need not be finite, and the default is implemented when it has not
been amended.21 We follow the literature by considering how a chair could manipulate
the agenda, though in our model, the chair directly manipulates the protocol (the order
in which proposers are recognized) because the agenda itself is endogenous.
6.2 Cooperative models of dynamic collective choice
Another strand of literature uses cooperative frameworks to study dynamic collective
choice with an endogenous default. These models abstract away from procedural de-
tails: there is no protocol that determines the choices of proposers and voters. Conse-
quently, they have little to say about proposal and agenda power. This stands in sharp
20Dutta et al. (2004) consider endogenous agenda formation in a less structured model, which is not
based on a specific game form or protocol.
21Our model therefore integrates features of successive elimination and amendment agendas.
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contrast to our model, in which the order and identity of proposers play a central role in
determining policy outcomes. Nevertheless, it is worth explaining the paper’s relation-
ship to those contributions in terms of predictions about policy outcomes.
Konishi and Ray (2003) develop a model of coalition formation that transplants the
blocking approach from traditional cooperative game theory to dynamic environments
with repeated implementation of the defaults. In particular, they study a related notion
of absorbing sets of Markovian equilibrium processes of coalition formation with far-
sighted players and a finite policy space. They prove that those absorbing states must
be contained in Chwe’s (1994) largest consistent set and that a stochastic equilibrium
process exists. Anesi (2006) shows that this solution concept is equivalent to a vNM
stable set (and may therefore not exist) when one focuses on deterministic processes.
However, he only studies games in which the policy space is finite and well ordered.
Vartiainen (2011) studies absorbing outcomes of a deterministic non-Markovian ver-
sion of Konishi and Ray’s coalition formation processes, assuming (like us) that players
only care about final outcomes. Focusing on finite policy spaces, he establishes exis-
tence of equilibrium processes. In that paper, coalitional moves in each period may
depend on the entire sequence of previous moves and on the identities of the coalitions
that initiated those moves. In Section 5.2, we also characterized the set of immovable
policies in our model when strategies are similarly history dependent. Our analysis re-
vealed that the set of immovable polices is then a superset of Chwe’s (1994) largest con-
sistent set, which itself contains the set of absorbing equilibrium outcomes in Vartiainen
(2011). Hence, every equilibrium policy outcome in Vartiainen (2011) can be imple-
mented in a history-dependent equilibrium of our model, but the converse may not be
true.
In a more recent paper that allows for a compact policy space, Vartiainen (2012)
characterizes deterministic, absorbing policy sequences that can only depend on the
history of defaults and that satisfy a one-deviation property. The set of absorbing
history-dependent policies (the consistent choice set (CCS)) exists. Proposition 6 asserts
that every CCS is the set of immovable policies for some semi-Markovian equilibrium of
our model. In addition, the converse is true if the policy space is well ordered or there is
a single proposer (Proposition 7), but may not be true otherwise. Vartiainen also shows
that policies that are implementable by a Markovian policy sequence form a vNM stable
set and that any vNM stable set is the outcome correspondence of such a Markov perfect
policy sequence. These results recall Propositions 1 and 2 above. Despite these paral-
lels, our results differ in one important respect. Vartiainen’s one-deviation property (like
Acemoglu et al.’s (2012) desirability axiom) implies that no winning coalition can prefer
the initial default (x) over the policy implemented according to equilibrium σ (φσ(x)).
This property holds in our model if X is well ordered or if there is a single proposer (the
premise of Proposition 7). However, as Observation 1(c) states, a winning coalition may
otherwise prefer the initial default, the intuition being that a winning coalition must
prefer φσ(x) to the policy that would be implemented if they did not amend x, rather
than preferring φσ(x) to x. It is therefore interesting that Propositions 1, 2, and 6 apply
even if the one-deviation property fails. The fundamental difference between our model
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and Vartiainen (2011, 2012) is that we do not allow winning coalitions to stop the bar-
gaining process. While winning coalitions can choose any alternative in X ∪ {STOP} in
Vartiainen (2011, 2012), STOP is not an option for coalitions in our framework. Bargain-
ing only ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default.
6.3 Noncooperative foundations
In common with a related literature, several of our results provide noncooperative foun-
dations for cooperative solution concepts in voting games, though, in contrast to this
literature, we develop this equivalence so as to explore how variations in our noncoop-
erative model affect outcomes.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the set of immovable policies in our model coincides
with the closure of the union of weakly stable sets. In this sense, our results are related
to Harsanyi (1974) and Anesi (2010, 2012).
Harsanyi (1974) provides microfoundations for vNM stable sets by presenting a bar-
gaining model in which a policy is only implemented when a default is not amended.
Each equilibrium of this model supports a vNM stable set, as in our model. However,
in contrast to Bernheim et al. (2006) and this paper, a chair selects coalitions that si-
multaneously propose policies and her payoff depends on the number of times that the
default is amended. Harsanyi’s model therefore allows any policy in the vNM stable set
that socially dominates the initial default to be implemented in equilibrium, for players
and the chair, respectively, only care about the implemented policy and the number of
amendments. By contrast, we are primarily interested in the policy implemented from
a given initial default. Our approach yields much tighter predictions about the imple-
mented policy, and also allows us to address issues of protocol manipulation. We com-
pare Harsanyi’s model with a variant on our model with a dynamic protocol in Section A
of the supplementary file.22
Our results on weakly stable sets are also related to Anesi (2010, 2012) and Diermeier
and Fong (2012). Anesi (2010) demonstrates that any vNM stable set is the absorbing set
of some pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria in a legislative bargaining game with
a finite, well ordered policy space, random proposers, and repeated implementation.
We extend Anesi (2010) in two respects. First, the model provides bargaining founda-
tions for weakly stable sets in a larger class of environments, allowing for infinite policy
spaces that are not well ordered. Second, we obtain a complete equivalence between the
class of weakly stable sets and the class of absorbing sets of pure-strategy Markov per-
fect equilibria.23  Anesi (2012) and Diermeier and Fong (2012) also obtain such an equiv-
alence, but in different settings—the former in a dynamic game of electoral competition
between two office-motivated parties; the latter in the bargaining game of Diermeier
and Fong (2011) with a unique proposer—and only for finite policy spaces and well
ordered preferences. While existence of a stable set (and therefore of a pure-strategy
22In contrast to Harsanyi (1974) and this paper, Hortala-Vallve (2011) studies play in a related model
without a weakly stable set.
23Anesi only proves that the former is a subset of the latter, demonstrating by example that the legislature
may choose policies outside stable sets when proposers are chosen randomly.
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Markov perfect equilibrium) is not guaranteed in Anesi (2010, 2012), Diermeier and
Fong (2012) establish existence in their single-proposer framework.
Finally, one may also interpret the results in Section 5.2 as providing noncoopera-
tive foundations for consistent choice sets and for quasi-consistent sets (and therefore
the largest consistent set). Vartiainen (2012) also presents a noncooperative model in
which players vote each round over X and implementation of the default. If the lat-
ter secures the most votes, then the game ends; otherwise, the default is amended to a
plurality winner (so, unlike our model, the game is not simple). Vartiainen shows that
every strong subgame perfect equilibrium satisfies the one-deviation property. Obser-
vation 1(c) would also fail in our model if we allowed for coalitional deviations.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a model of bargaining in which the committee takes a single pol-
icy seriously at any time and implements this policy if no proposer is willing or able to
amend it. We have characterized the policies that can be reached from any initial default
and shown that every equilibrium of the model supports a weakly stable set. We have
provided conditions for a chair to manipulate the protocol, showing that she cannot im-
prove on proposing last if the policy space is well ordered and there is a unique weakly
stable set. We have also shown, inter alia, that an increase in the quota can contract the
union of immovable policies.
There are various natural extensions of the model. First, our assumption that a pro-
posal is a single policy could be replaced by the supposition that players provisionally
agree to subsets of the policy space, thereby allowing us to address multi-issue negoti-
ations in which no partial agreement is finalized until all issues have been addressed.
Second, we have focused on pure-strategy solutions, at the cost of nonexistence. It is
easy to see that mixed strategy equilibria may exist in situations like the Condorcet para-
dox, where there is no stable set. On the other hand, there are multiple stable sets and,
therefore, a multiplicity of (pure-strategy) equilibria in other situations. It would be in-
teresting to develop refinements that reduce this multiplicity. However, we can show
that Acemoglu et al.’s (2009) refinement has no power in our model if the policy space is
finite and well ordered. (Proof of this claim is available from the authors on request.)
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let V ∈ V and let g ∈ V X be a selection of Fπ(V  ·). By con-
struction of Fπ(V x), for every x ∈ X , there exists a vector (y1(x)     ymx+1(x)) such
that two scenarios exist:
• If x ∈ V , then g(x)= y1(x)= · · · = ymx+1(x)= x.
• If x /∈ V , then g(x) = y1(x) ∈ V , x = ymx+1(x), and yk(x) ∈ sπk (V  yk+1(x)) for each
k= 1    mx. The latter condition implies that yk(x) is one of the kth proposer’s
ideal policies in a set Ak(V  yk+1(x)) ≡ PV (yk+1(x)) ∪ {yk+1(x)} ∪ Y , where Y ⊆
RV (yk+1(x)).
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We now define voting behavior in the putative equilibrium strategy profile σ . If the
ongoing default is x ∈X , then player i= πx(k) proposes yk(x) (if given the opportunity)
with yk(x)= x being interpreted as pass. Therefore, all proposers pass when the current
default belongs to V .
When the ongoing default is x and the kth proposer has just proposed to change x
to y = x, σ prescribes player i to vote yes if and only if one of the following conditions
holds:
(A) x ∈ V and y1(y)i x
(B) x /∈ V , y1(y) ∈Ak(V  yk+1(x)), and y1(y)i yk+1(x)
(C) x /∈ V , y1(y) /∈Ak(V  yk+1(x)), and y1(y)i yk+1(x).
To prove the proposition, we proceed in three steps. The first step shows that
fσ(x1)= g(x) for all x ∈X . Step 2 shows that there is no voting stage in which a voter
has a profitable one-shot deviation from σ . Step 3 demonstrates that there is no pro-
posal stage in which a proposer has a profitable one-shot deviation fromσ . Steps 2 and 3
jointly imply that no player has a profitable one-shot deviation from σ . This proves that
no player can profitably deviate from σ in a finite number of stages. Finally, as infinite
bargaining sequences constitute the worst outcomes for all players, this proves that σ is
an equilibrium.
Step 1. We have fσ(x) ≡ fσ(x1) = y1(x) for all x ∈ X and, in particular, fσ(x) = x
for all x ∈ V ; hence,⋃x∈X fσ(x)= V .
Consider an arbitrary round t starting with default xt−1 = x. If x ∈ V , then the result
is trivial: all proposers pass and x is implemented at the end of the round. Suppose
then that x /∈ V . Let l = max{k ∈ {1    mx} : yk(x) = yk+1(x)} (external stability ensures
that this set is nonempty) and suppose that the lth proposer is given the opportunity to
make a proposal. By construction of (y1(x)     ym+1(x)), this implies that yl(x) ∈ V and,
therefore, yl(x) = y1(yl(x)) ∈ Al(V  yl+1(x)), where ymx(x) ≡ x. The definition of voting
strategies (condition (B)) then implies that all members of {i ∈ N : yl(x) i yl+1(x)} vote
yes, so that yl(x) = xt . As xt = yl(x) ∈ V , all proposers pass in round t + 1 and yl(x) is
implemented.
Now consider the (l − 1)th proposer. Suppose that she is given the opportunity to
make a proposal. If she passes (so yl−1(x) = yl(x)), then, by construction, yl−1(x) is
implemented at the end of the next round. If she proposes an amendment, then she
must propose yl−1(x) ∈Al−1(V  yl(x)). By definition of Al−1(V  yl(x)), this implies that
{i ∈N : yl−1(x)i yl(x)} ∈W, so condition (B) implies that yl−1(x) is accepted and imple-
mented at the end of the next round. In sum, yl−1(x) is accepted and implemented at
the end of the next round.
Repeating this argument recursively for every l = 1     l − 2, we obtain that
fσ(x1) = y1(x). This proves that fσ(x) ≡ fσ(x1) = g(x) for all x ∈ X . By construc-
tion, g(x) = x for all x ∈ V and g(x) ∈ Fπ(V x)⊆ V for all x ∈X . Hence, ⋃x∈X fσ(x)=⋃
x∈X g(x)= V .
Step 2. Consider a proposal y by the kth proposer when the ongoing default is x = y.
σi prescribes i ∈N to vote yes whenever fσ(y1)i f σ(xk+ 1), and to vote no whenever
fσ(xk+ 1)i f σ(y1).
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From Step 1, we know that fσ(y1)= y1(y) ∈ V .
Any x ∈ V is implemented at the end of round t if the kth proposer fails to amend
it, for, by definition of the proposer strategies, all the remaining proposers will pass.
Hence, fσ(xk+1)= x. Consequently, fσ(y1)i f σ(xk+1) is equivalent to y1(y)i x,
which in turn implies that player i must vote yes (condition (A) in the definition of voting
strategies). Similarly, fσ(xk+ 1)i f σ(y1) implies that xi y1(y). Hence, i must vote
no.
If x /∈ V , then fσ(xk + 1) = yk+1(x). To see this, suppose first that no proposer
l > k amends x. We then have yk+1(x) = · · · = ymx(x) = x = fσ(xk+ 1). Now suppose
that the lth proposer is the next proposer (after the kth) to make a successful proposal,
yl(x) = x. By construction, this implies that yk+1(x) = · · · = yl(x) ∈ V . Consequently,
fσ(xk+ 1)= fσ(yl(x)1)= yl(x)= yk+1(x).
Thus, fσ(y1) i f σ(xk + 1) implies that y1(y) i yk+1(x). Conditions (B) and
(C) in the definition of voting strategies then imply that player i votes yes. Similarly,
fσ(xk+ 1)i f σ(y1) implies that she votes no.
Step 3. In any proposal stage with ongoing default x, the kth proposer cannot gain by
offering some y = yk(x) and conforming to σπx(k) thereafter.
If x ∈ V , then σ prescribes the kth proposer to pass (i.e., yk(x) = x). If she has a
profitable deviation at this stage then she must be able to amend x to some y such that
fσ(y1) = y1(y) πx(k) x. Indeed, if she does not deviate, then all the remaining pro-
posers will pass (yl(x)= x for all l) and x will then be the final outcome. As proposal y is
successful, condition (A) in the definition of voting strategies implies that there is a win-
ning coalition whose members all strictly prefer y1(y) ∈ V to x ∈ V . This is impossible
because V satisfies (ISP ).
If x /∈ V , then σ prescribes the kth proposer to propose yk(x) ∈AVk (yk+1(x)) (where
yk(x) = x means that she should pass). Suppose that, instead, she proposes some
y = yk(x). The resulting outcome will be fσ(y1) = y1(y) if y is a successful proposal
(i.e., y1(y) ∈ RV (yk+1(x))) and will be fσ(y1) = yk+1(x) otherwise. Such a deviation
cannot be profitable because yk(x) is πx(k)-maximal in [RV (yk+1(x))∪ {yk+1(x)}]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 hinges on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If σ is an equilibrium of (πx0), then fσ(X)≡⋃x∈X fσ(x) is a weakly stable
set.
Proof. Let σ be an equilibrium of (πx0). To prove the lemma, we must show that
fσ(X) satisfies (ISP ) and (ESR).
(ISP ). If |fσ(X)| = 1, then P-internal stability is trivial. So suppose that |fσ(X)| ≥ 2.
Imagine that fσ(X) does not satisfy (ISP ). This implies that there are two policies in
fσ(X), say x and y, such that x P y. By definition of fσ(X), x and y are fixed points
of fσ(·1). An immediate consequence of x P y is, therefore, that there is a winning
coalition S ∈W such that fσ(x1) i f σ(y1) for every i ∈ S. But this implies that any
proposer in S could amend y to x, contrary to our supposition that σ is an equilibrium
of (πx0).
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(ESR). Suppose that fσ(X) does not satisfy (ESR). This implies that there exists a
policy x /∈ fσ(X) such that, for all y ∈ fσ(X), ¬(y R x). In particular, ¬[fσ(y1) R x] for
all y ∈ fσ(X). Consequently, in any S ∈W and for any y ∈ fσ(X), there is at least one
player who strictly prefers x to fσ(y1).
Now consider the continuation game that starts with x as the ongoing default pol-
icy. Suppose that the last potential proposer, πx(mx), is given the opportunity to amend
x with some policy y = x. Players anticipate that f σ(y1) ∈ fσ(X) will eventually be
implemented if x is amended and that x will be implemented otherwise. As no win-
ning coalition including proposer πx(mx) would support the amendment, x should be
implemented. As a consequence, another proposer must amend x in equilibrium.
Now consider πx(mx − 1). We can repeat the same reasoning as with πx(mx). If
πx(mx − 1) offers to change x to some policy y = x, then all committee members antic-
ipate that this will lead to fσ(y1) being the final outcome if the amendment is voted
up and lead to x being implemented otherwise. Again, no winning coalition would sup-
port the amendment and x would be implemented. Repeating this argument recursively
until the first proposer πx(1), we obtain the desired contradiction. 
We now return to the main proposition. Let σ = (σi)i∈C be an equilibrium of
(πx0). From Lemma 1, we know that there exists V ∈ V such that fσ(X) = V . Evi-
dently, for all x ∈ V , we have {fσ(x1)} = {x} = Fπ(V x).
Now consider an arbitrary x /∈ V and an arbitrary round starting with x as the ongo-
ing default. Suppose that (possibly off the equilibrium path) the mxth proposer is given
the opportunity to amend x. When she offers a policy y = x, voters compare f σ(y1) ∈ V
with x. Voter i must, therefore, vote yes if fσ(y1) i x, may vote either yes or no if
fσ(y1) ∼i x, and must vote no otherwise. The acceptance set faced by the mxth pro-
poser, i.e., the set of policies y = x that would be accepted by a winning coalition to
amend x, must then be the set of policies y such that fσ(y1) belongs to [PV (x)∪Y ] ⊆ V ,
where Y is some (possibly empty) subset of RV (x). As a consequence, if σπx(mx) pre-
scribes the mxth proposer to amend x with y¯mx = x, then fσ(xmx) = fσ(y¯mx1) must
be πx(mx)-maximal in [PV (x) ∪ Y ∪ {x}] (x is always feasible to the mxth proposer, for
she can always pass). If σπx(mx) prescribes the mxth proposer not to amend x, i.e., to
pass or to make an unsuccessful proposal, then f σ(xmx)= x must be πx(mx)-maximal
in [PV (x)∪Y ∪ {x}]. This proves that ymx ≡ fσ(xmx) ∈ sπm(V x).
Proceeding recursively, one can use the same argument to show that, for each
k = 1    mx − 1, yk ≡ fσ(xk) ∈ sπk (V x): just substitute yk+1 for x in the argument
above. Since x /∈ V = fσ(X), there must be some proposer k who amends x, so
that fσ(xk) = x. This proves that the finite sequence (y1     ymxx) ≡ (f σ(x1)    
f σ(xmx)x) constitutes a path of tree Tπ(V x) whose terminal node belongs to V .
Hence, fσ(x) ∈ Fπ(V x). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let σ be an equilibrium. Proposition 2 implies that there
must be some weakly stable set V such that fσ(X) = V . Consider the kth proposer as
defined in the statement of the proposition. If she failed to amend the ongoing default
x, then nobody else would and x would be implemented at the end of the round. As
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she strictly prefers her ideal policy in the set of equilibrium policy outcomes that dom-
inate x (i.e., M(π(l)R(x) ∩ fσ(X))) to x, she must successfully propose that policy in
equilibrium.
We therefore need to show that no proposer who is given the opportunity to amend x
before the kth proposer can successfully do so. Suppose first that the (k− 1)th proposer
successfully offers some policy y. This implies there is a winning coalition in W whose
members all strictly prefer fσ(y1) ∈ V to M(π(l)R(x) ∩ fσ(X)) ∈ V : a contradiction
with V satisfying (ISP ). Applying this argument recursively from the (k− 2)th proposer
until the first, we obtain the result. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We first construct δ¯. For each i ∈ C and every pair (x y) ∈X2
such that ui(x) > ui(y), let
i(x yδ)≡ min
TxTy∈{1|X|}
δTxui(x)+ (1− δTx)ui − δTyui(y)− (1− δTy )u¯i
where u¯i ≡maxx∈X ui(x) and ui ≡minx∈X ui(x). Since i(x yδ)→ ui(x)− ui(y) > 0 as
δ→ 1, there exists δi(x y) ∈ [01) such that i(x yδ) > 0 for all δ > δi(x y). From now
on, we assume that
δ > δ¯≡max
i∈N
max
xy∈X:xiy
δi(x y) ∈ (01)
Suppose, first, that σ is an equilibrium of (πx0). This implies that, at any stage of
this game, no player i has a profitable one-shot deviation from σi (given σ−i). Consider
an arbitrary stage of (πx0) and let x be the final policy outcome if i does not deviate
from σi in that stage. Hence, any other policy outcome y = x she could induce by a one-
shot deviation satisfies: ui(y) < ui(x). Suppose that, contrary to the statement of the
result, i has a profitable one-shot deviation at the same stage in δ(πx0). This implies
that there are two finite sequences {xt}t=1Tx and {yt}t=1Ty , and a policy y ∈X such
that
(1− δ)
Ty∑
t=1
δt−1ui(yt)+ δTyui(y) > (1− δ)
Tx∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt)+ δTxui(x)
and ui(y) < ui(x) (recall that a one-stage deviation from an equilibrium strategy in
(πx0) must converge in a finite number of rounds). This is impossible when δ > δ¯. By
the one-shot deviation principle, σ is then an absorbing stationary Markov equilibrium
of δ(πx0).
Now suppose thatσ is an absorbing stationary Markov equilibrium of δ(πx0). This
implies that no player i has a profitable one-shot deviation from σi (given σ−i) at any
stage of this game. Consider an arbitrary stage of δ(πx0) and let {xt}t=1Tx+1 be the
finite sequence of policy outcomes (with x= xTx+1 being implemented indefinitely) if i
does not deviate from σi at that stage. Hence, any other sequence {yt}t=1Ty+1 (with
y = yTy+1 being implemented indefinitely) she could induce by a one-shot deviation
satisfies
(1− δ)
Ty∑
t=1
δt−1ui(yt)+ δTyui(y)≤ (1− δ)
Tx∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt)+ δTxui(x)
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This inequality implies that ui(x) > ui(y). To see this, suppose instead that ui(y) > ui(x).
Then δ > δ¯ implies that i(yxδ) > 0, so that
(1− δ)
Ty∑
t=1
δt−1ui(yt)+ δTyui(y)−
[
(1− δ)
Tx∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt)− δTxui(x)
]
≥i(yxδ) > 0
a contradiction. At the equivalent stage in game (πx0), ui(x) > ui(y) clearly implies
that player i has no profitable one-shot deviation in this stage. This in turn implies that
player i cannot profitably deviate from σi in a finite number of stages. Finally, as infinite
bargaining sequences constitute the worst outcomes for all legislators in (πx0), this
proves that σ is an equilibrium of (πx0). 
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